The banality of law: some remarks on legal conventionalism by Dyrda, Adam
 
 
 
 
25th IVR World Congress 
 
LAW SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Frankfurt am Main 
 
15–20 August 2011 
 
Paper Series 
No. 074 / 2012 
Series D 
History of Philosophy; Hart, Kelsen, Radbruch, Habermas, Rawls; Luhmann; General 
Theory of Norms, Positivism 
 
 
Adam Dyrda 
The Banality of Law: Some 
Remarks on Legal Conventionalism 
 
 
 
 
  
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-249325 
 
This paper series has been produced using texts submitted by authors until April 2012. No 
responsibility is assumed for the content of abstracts. 
 
 
Conference Organizers: 
Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Ulfrid Neumann, 
Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main 
Professor Dr. Klaus Günther, Goethe 
University, Frankfurt/Main; Speaker of the 
Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of 
Normative Orders” 
Professor Dr. Lorenz Schulz M.A., Goethe  
University, Frankfurt/Main 
Edited by: 
Goethe University Frankfurt am Main 
Department of Law 
Grüneburgplatz 1 
60629 Frankfurt am Main 
Tel.: [+49] (0)69 - 798 34341 
Fax: [+49] (0)69 - 798 34523 
 
 
 
 1 
Adam Dyrda
†, Cracow / Poland 
 
The Banality of Law: Some Remarks on Legal Conventionalism  
 
Abstract: The paper is concerned with the Hartian idea that the justification of law’s normativity can be 
traced back to the exquisite social fact, viz. special kind of social convention. After discussing the view 
that the rule of recognition is a coordinative convention A. Marmor’s idea of constitutive convention is 
introduced. Relying on J. Dickson’s brilliant enquiry I finally argue that this latter idea is deprieved of 
any  explanatory  power,  which  was  pressuposed  by  H.L.A.  Hart  when  he  himself  reffered  to  the 
conventional rule of recognition as social fact having full normative significance. 
Keywords: conventionalism, rule of reconition, coordination convention, constitutive convention. 
 
Law is usually, by practicioners, as well as by laymen, described as trivially conventional. The 
platitude, to which such assumption of  conventional nature of law refers, is not entirely clear. To 
stress the conventional character of law, if it is supposed to have any deeper sense, is to say that 
law  has  “conventional  foundations”.  However,  many  important  philosophical  problems  arise, 
when  a  closer  look  at  the  notion  in  question  is  taken.  If  we  cannot  simply  presuppose  the 
existence, validity and normativity of legal rules, as H. Kelsen did, we may try  to find the 
ultimate source of legality in some kind of a conventional, social fact. This problem may  be 
called “the Conventionality Puzzle”, analogously to the problem of general normativity of law, 
recently called by S. Shapiro “the Possibility Puzzle”
1. 
The idea of convention, considered as ultimate justification of the existence of many social 
facts  (including  language)  has  been  analyzed  and  criticized  for  a  very  long  time.  The  first 
straightforward important response to the classical conventionalism (defended by R. Carnap) was 
presented by W.V. Quine (and also by N. Goodman and L. Wittgenstein), who had deprived the 
idea of convention of such an ultimate, constructive function. They claimed that a convention 
cannot be identified with any kind of „ultimate decision“. If there is a decision to be made, there 
must  always  be  a  preliminary  criterion  allowing  to  circumscribe  sorts  of  matters  which  the 
decision is to be applied to. Such identification would be nothing but a stratagem, as far as the 
first  decision  under  deliberation  must  be  premised  by  another  one.  And  so  on...  Therefore, 
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language, as well as law, cannot be ultimately justified by any  conventional fact (decision or 
agreement), because, as Quine noted, such fact is not only merely unhistorical, but unthinkable
2. 
This idea is expressed in his famous metaphor: 
“The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. ... It is a pale gray lore, black with fact and 
white with convention. But I have found no substantial reasons for concluding that there are any 
quite black threads in it, or any white ones”
3 
The Quinean conclusion is that we can talk about ‘conventionalism’ like of having in mind 
the idea of white color, but we cannot speak of ‘pure conventions’ and ‘pure facts’ alone, as there 
are no quite white or quite black threads in the real world (the description of which is the fabric 
of  sentences).  The  notion  of  ‘convention’  itself  is  no  more  of  any  practical  use,  since  the 
conventions of language (and, all the more, social – moral and legal conventions – made by using 
some minimum of language to state them) could not possibly have originated by any kind of 
agreement (implicit or explicit, in each case based on arbitrary decision), because some of them 
would have been needed to provide the rudimentary language in which the first agreement was 
made
4.The  Wittgensteinenian  idea  of  forms  of  life  has  very  much  in  common  with  that 
anticonventionalist conclusion. 
Without  undermining  the  idea  of  anticonventionalist  foundations  of  language,  some 
philosophers wanted to show anyway that deliberating over conventionality of language is not 
only a matter speaking over mere regularities our use of language conforms to, but has some 
deeper  sense,  abstracted  from  our  common  use  of  language,  and  thus  save  the  primordial, 
“conventionalist” intuition.  
The revival of that basic intuition was initiated by D. Lewis’ Convention, where he tried to 
analyze common, established concept of convention, so that every reader would recognize that it 
explains what she or he must have in mind when she or he says that language – like many other 
activities – is governed by conventions
5. Lewis treats convention as an important phenomenon, 
which creates languages and other social institutions without any explicit act or event of agreeing 
and in  a way that is generally difficult to describe. Roughly speaking, Lewis described a 
convention as a solution to a coordination problem (which arise in non -zero sum coordination 
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games).  In  the  game-theory  terms,  the  definition  of  coordination  problems  reads  as  follows: 
coordination problems are situations of interdependent decision by two or more agents in which 
coincidence of interests predominates and in which there are two or more proper coordination 
equilibria
6. The complicated, but rational idea of conv ention lurks form Lewisian account, the 
main aim of which was to save the intuition of saying that ordinary language is “conventional”.   
Legal positivists attempt to save the intuition of conventionality of law They are trying to 
defend the basic Hartian practice theory of rules against the attack of Dworkin. Dworkin, roughly 
speaking,  claimed  that  legal  positivism,  which  accepts  the  Social  Fact  Thesis,  cannot 
simultaneously accept the Normativity Thesis. These theses can be formulated as follows
7  
 (NT): “Law is a form of practical reasoning; like morality and prudence, it defines a general 
framework for practical reasoning. We understand law only if we understand how it is that laws 
give members of a community, officials and law-subjects alike, reasons for acting. Thus any 
adequate general theory of law must give a satisfactory account of the normative (reason-giving) 
character of law and must relate the framework of practical reasoning defined by law to the 
framework of morality and prudence”. 
(SFT): “Law is a social fact; what is and what is not to count as law is a matter of fact about 
human social behavior and institutions which can be described in terms which do not entail any 
evaluation of the behavior of the institutions. We understand law only if we understand it as a 
kind of social institution which can be said to exist only if it is actually in force and directs 
human behavior in the community. Any adequate general theory of law must give a satisfactory 
account of law as a social phenomenon”. 
It seems that potentially these theses are in conflict, and the relationship between them “set 
the agenda for much of philosophical jurisprudence”
8. 
It was G. Postema and J. Coleman who tried to cover the gap between these two theses by 
applying the notion of Lewisian convention (and similar coordination concepts) to legal theory. 
Such attempt was clearly understandable, because in The Concept of Law Hart openly refers to 
the idea that law rests, at its foundations, on a special and complex custom or convention
9, but 
does  not  present  any  detailed  account  of  it.  The  (softly  amended)  Lewisian  definitionof 
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convention,  which  served  for  that,  could  therefore  stand  as  a  particular  explanation  of  the 
phenomenon which Hart had in mind. It is as follows: 
“A regularity R in the behavior of persons in a population P in a recurring situation S is as 
convention if and only if in any instance of S 
(1)  it is a common knowledge in P that 
(a)  there is in P general conformity to R; 
(b)  most members of P expect most members of P to conform to R; 
(c)  almost  every  member  of  P  prefers  that  any  individual  conform  rather  than  not 
conform  to  some  regularity  of  behavior  in  S,  given  general  conformity  to  that 
regularity; 
(d)  almost every member of P prefers general conformity to some regularity rather than 
general non-conformity (i.e., general conformity to no regularity); 
(2)  part of reason why most members of P conform to R in S is that 1a-1d obtain”
10. 
 
The strategy of using such a concept of convention is, however, different from the basic insight 
of Hart. Postema tries to shift the focus of the doctrine away from regularities of behavior and 
attitude which, as Hart believed, “constitute” the rule of recognition  (socio-legal facts) to the 
strategic  context  of  practical  reasoning,  in  which  such  regularities  take  on  normative 
significance
11. The concept of Lewisian convention can be used to fuse the NT and the SFT, 
because, although the presented definition of convention does not contain any normative terms 
like “ought”, “should”, “good” and others, and therefore “convention” is itself not a normative 
term,  nevertheless  it  can  be  used  normatively,  since  conventions  may  be  species  of  norms: 
regularities to which we believe one ought to conform
12. The point is that the conditions indicated 
in the definition (of both Lewis and Postema) leads to the conclusion that in order to accept the 
existence of some convention in P we must agree that coordination (general conformity) is 
significantly valuable to the parties and “were general conformity does not obtain, that fact would 
provide a significant reason against performing the action in question, a reason which may be 
sufficient to defeat other independent reasons in favor of performing the action”
13. Therefore, the 
coordination  problem  is  supposed  to  be  the  central  and  fundamental  problem  in  the 
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conventionalist legal theory. 
Such idea has many strengths and vices. It links the idea of law as social fact with the idea of 
legal normativity. The cost is that it puts the coordination problem in the centre (de facto Postema 
describes three levels of relations between legal officials and laypersons on which coordination 
problems arise). For the sake of brevity I will skip the detailed description of Postema arguments 
for central significance of coordination convention. What shall be stressed is that all his efforts to 
demonstrate the importance of coordination problems advance a claim that the structure or logic 
of the practical reasoning is implicit in decision-making situations and in the idea that law is 
characteristically a matter of public rules. It does not mean that every decision is necessarily a 
solution to some coordination problem, but only that no legal system is conceivable without 
substantial coordination elements at its foundations
14.  
The same substantial element of coordination (or cooperation) in law has been recently 
addressed  by  J.  Coleman,  who  committed  himself  to  the  idea  of  M.  Bratman’s  Shared 
Cooperative Activity (SCA). I skip  the description of Coleman’s insight, because although it is in 
certain  aspects  weaker,  and  in  some  other  stronger  than  Postema’s  application  of  Lewisian 
definition, the point is that as far as it is a problem of social theory, not of jurisprudence as such, 
it surely does not affect the general, “hypercommital”
15 anatomy of the coordination approach. 
Therefore  I  shall  now  present  another  approach,  which  has  been  built  on  the  criticism  of 
coordination stance.  
A. Marmor believes  that  we must appeal  to  a novel  kind  of convention, a “constitutive 
convention”, in order to accommodate the facts of disagreement and the relevance of appeals to 
evaluative  argument  in  legal  practice
16.  The  main  function  of  constitutive  conventions  is, 
obviously, to constitute social practices. 
The starting point of Marmor’s considerations is the distinction, made by J. Searle, between 
regulative and constitutive rules. According to Searle, “regulative rules regulate antecedently or 
independently existing forms of behavior; […] constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they 
create or define new forms of behavior”
17. Leaving aside some particular difficulties of such 
distinction, Marmor maintains  that Searle’s insight “is basically correct and captures something 
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of  great  importance”
18.  He  claims,  that  if  there  was  a  mistake  in  Searle’s  account,  it  was 
(presumably) to assume that rules constitute particular actions or “new forms of behavior”. Thus, 
Marmor is allowed to develop the Searle’s idea in the following way. “Actions are not constituted 
by rules, but social practices, that is, certain types of activities, are. It is only when we have a 
whole structure of rule-governed activity, with some complexity and interconnections between 
the rules,  we can say that we have a social practice constituted by rules. Constitutive rules are 
those rules that constitute a type of activity, a social practice”
19. He differentiates between two 
basic types of such constitutive rules: (1) social conventions, and (2) institutionally enacted rules. 
The  model  example  of  a  social  practice,  constituted  by  rules,  which  are  constitutive 
conventions, is the game of chess. It would be implausible to think that rules of chess evolved as 
a solution to any large-scale recurrent coordination problem that had arisen among potential chess 
players before chess was invented. One may try to structure a very vague and highly general 
coordination problem: “there we are, wanting to play some structured broad game, and then rules 
have evolved to solve that problem”. Such a coordination problem would be too abstract and 
underspecified. Not every concerted action a number of agents counts as solution to coordination 
problem in a relevant sense; otherwise the idea of coordination convention would be deprived of 
any philosophical significance. Moreover, the essential rationale of the game – all reasons people 
normally have for playing chess – have very little to do with solving a coordination problem 
(even if we could tell a story that would explain the emergence of chess as a solution to some 
vague coordination problem, actual reasons for playing chess would be independent of such a 
story). “Of course, once the game is there and it is being played, it may give rise to various 
coordination problems that may get solved by additional rules and conventions. But the essential 
rationale of the game is ill explained in terms of a solution to a coordination problem. It is true, of 
course, that in playing any structured game, part of the reason we have to stick to the rules, and 
be sure that we all know what the rules are, is to make sure that our actions are well coordinated. 
So yes, undoubtedly there is a coordinative function to any such rule-guided activity, like playing 
a structured competitive game. But this is one aspect of playing chess, not its main rationale. And 
it  is  an  aspect  that  is  present  in  any  rule-governed  activity,  whether  conventional  or  not”
20. 
Therefore, the idea of social convention corresponds to the fact that generally conventions evolve 
as responses to numerous kinds of social needs, they serve a variety of social functions, and 
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finally  –  are  not  all  reducible  to  coordination  problems
21. The function of the constitutive 
convention constituting chess is “to define what counts as winning and losing game, what are 
permissible and impermissible moves in the game, and so on”
22.  
It is worth noting, that constitutive conventions always have a dual function: the rules both 
constitute the practice, and, at the same time, they regulate conduct within it
23. More importantly, 
as Marmor argues, constitutive conventions typically constitute also some of the values that are 
inherent in the practice and the kind of evaluative discourse that applies to it (in our exemplary 
case  of  chess  such  values  are  intellectual  skills  of  strategic  computation,  memory  etc. ). 
“Following constitutive conventions amounts to a type of activity, and it is this activity that has 
value for those who engage in it (and sometimes others who care about it)”
24. In particular cases 
some of these values may make sense only as instances of following the relevant conventions and 
can be explained only in specific context of the practice constituted by them. 
Among many features of constitutive conventions, a few seem to be quite important. Firstly, 
constitutive conventions come always in system of rules – there is basically no such thing as a 
single-rule social practice. Coordination conventions do not have this feature; they can be fairly 
isolated,  standing  on  its  own,  as  it  were,  without  forming  part  of  an  interlocking  system  of 
norms
25. Secondly, it is typical of constitutive conventions that we tend to have a very partial 
knowledge  of  them.  The  awareness  of  constitutive  conventions  in  society  is  a  matter  of  “a 
division of labor, taking place in concentric circles; the closer one is to the center, the greater 
effect one has on what the convention is; and vice versa, of course”
26. We may be aware that 
there  are  particular  conventions  in  our  society,  but,  while  standing  in  the  outer  circle,  our 
knowledge would be rather partial and in case of such conventions we would rest on experts and 
better practitioners (the inner circle), whose practice determines and interprets the practice of 
convention. Marmor roughly notes: “Note that (almost) none of this is expected to obtain in the 
case  of  coordination  conventions.  Coordination  conventions  are  there  to  solve  a  particular 
recurrent coordination problem. Such conventions cannot be expected to solve the coordination 
problem  if  most  people  are  largely  ignorant  about  their  content”
27.  Thirdly,  constitutive 
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conventions  are  typically  prone  to  change  over  time,  and  to  that  extend  they  differ  from 
coordination  conventions.  The  reasons  for  change  are  the  core  of  difference.  As  we  know, 
coordination conventions are normative solutions to some type of coordination problem. “If the 
relevant  normative solution  that has  evolved forms  a stable equilibrium, then as  long as  the 
circumstances  remain  constant,  there  would  not  be  any  particular  pressure  of  change.  If  the 
convention does not constitute a stable equilibrium, a pressure may build up to reach that stage, if 
circumstances allow. Sometimes, however, the cost of change is higher than its potential gains, 
and therefore, even if there is a reason to shift to a better convention, that reason may be defeated 
by the costs that are involved in the change itself”
28. On the contrary, constitutive conventions 
have an additional factor that often affects the dynamics of change, namely they are able to 
constitute “a whole grammar of, inter alia, evaluative concerns” that might come to affect the 
point, content and shape of constitutive conventions themselves. Thus, constitutive conventions 
tend to be in a constant process of (re)interpretation that is partly affected by external values, but 
partly by those same values that are constituted by the conventional practice itself
29. Moreover, 
since constitutive conventions seem to “constitute some of the values inherent in the relevant 
practice, those values would normally call for interpretation and reevaluation over time, and this 
process is likely to bring changes in the constitutive conventions”. Due to that fact we might say 
that constitutive conventions develop gradually, they have a history and that history tends to be 
socially significant
30.  
The rules of chess, which were the maj or example of constitutive conventions, as it was 
mentioned, have a dual function: they constitute what the game is, and they prescribe norms that 
players ought to follow. “Similarly, Hart has claimed, the rules of recognition define or constitute 
what  law  in  a  certain  society  is,  and  they  prescribe  (that  is,  authorize)  modes  of 
creating/modifying law in that society. Social rules can determine their ought, as were, by being 
followed (viz. regarded as binding) by a certain community, just as the rules of chess determine 
their ﾫoughtﾻ within the game that is actually followed by the relevant community”
31.   
The RR is the rule, which makes judges  able to see themselves as institutional players, 
playing, as it were, a fairly structured role in an elaborate practice. Moreover, in original Harts 
account the main rationale of the RR consists in the need for certainty (what allowed him to 
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distinguish  between  “primitive”  and  “developed”  legal  systems).  In  the  Postscript  Hart  adds 
another kind of reason for having the RR, basically of coordinative nature: “Certainly the rule of 
recognition is treated in my book as resting on a conventional form of judicial custom. That it 
does so rest seems quite clear at least in English and American law for surely an English judge’s 
reason  for  treating  Parliament’s  legislation  (or  an  American  judge’s  reason  for  treating  the 
Constitution) as a source of law having supremacy over other sources includes the fact that his 
judicial colleagues in this as their predecessors have done”
32 Marmor contests both kinds of 
rationale presented by Hart (and accepted by Postema and Coleman). Although the certainty 
about what counts as law in our society certainly exists, it is doubtful to treat such reason as the 
main one. It is so, because there must be some reasons for having law first, and then, as he 
argues, it might also be important to have a certain level of certainty about it. Marmor claims that 
“the reasons for having rules of recognition are closely tied to the reasons for having law, and in 
some ways (yet to be specified), they instantiate these reasons”
33. On the other hand, although it 
is true that officials need a great deal of coordination in various respects (especially, in following 
basically the same rules that other officials follow in identifying the relevant sources of law), it is 
necessary first to identify them as judges. Therefore we first need a set of rules that constitute 
their specific institutional roles. “In short, and more generally, first we need the institutions of 
law, then we may also have some coordination problems that may require the normative solution. 
The basic role of the rules of recognition is to constitute the relevant institutions”
34. If it is so, the 
fundamental  RR  of  a  legal  system  must  be  constitutive  convention  (or,  more  precisely,  a 
systematic complex of constitutive conventions). In opposition to Postema, Coleman and many 
other legal theorist, Marmor denies that the main rationale of law itself is of coordinative nature 
(it may be only its minor function). Marmor, citing the work of L. Green
35 claims that “the idea 
that law’s main functions in society can be reduced to solution of coordination problems is all too 
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easy to refute”
36, supposing that his conception stands firmly against all possible critique.  
The  critique  of  Marmor’s  stance  refers  to  his  account  of  internal  and  external  legal 
obligations
37. Even for Marmor it is clear that the primary reasons, on which judges are supposed 
to act, are not the auxiliary reasons (internal obligations), but are of squarely “external” kind. The 
reasons founding external obligations of adherence to the RR are therefore not legal reasons. 
According to Hart, the common official practice (the  social fact) is – what has been recently 
plausibly reminded by J. Dickson
38 – properly understood as a necessary existence condition of 
the  rule of recognition (henceforth “RR”), and as playing an identifying role with regard to it. It 
does not, however, necessarily commit one to the view that the RR is a conventional rule, in the 
sense that such practice, being its existence condition, also necessarily supplies judges (and other 
participants in practice) with reasons why they ought to accept and follow that rule (that is - 
external  reasons)
39. It is worth reminding that, even in case of orig inal account of Lewis, a 
convention was supposed to be normative only in context of “internal” obligation, insofar as the 
need  of  “external”  justification  was  replaced  by  the  factual  appearance  of  a  recurring 
coordination problem and some practical need of solving it. 
As we know, the RR is the ultimate validity condition of first-order legal norms, but itself it 
is a social rule, which is not valid in legal sense. It is constituted by the common practice of 
officials. Such practice may have some constitutive features, like these described by Marmor. 
Therefore,  although  we  could  call  such  a  practice  “constitutive”,  due  to  the  fact  it  is 
“constituting” the rules of “the legal game”, actually it “cannot settle for the judge, or anyone else 
for  that  matter,  whether  they  should  play  by  the  rules  of  law  or  not”
40.  Such  rule,  having 
constituted the framework of the game, can only “tell judges what the law is” (it is an identifying 
role of the RR), but not why they ought to apply it. 
Dickson is right, when characterizing Marmor’s account in this way: “Marmor seems to 
contend that the existence of a rule of recognition, understood as a constitutive convention, does 
not answer the question of what underlying primary reasons judges have for «playing the legal 
game» and for accepting the rules of their legal system, including the rule of recognition, as 
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binding”
41.  She  accurately  finds  Marmor  as  suggesting  that,  if  assumed  that  judges  have 
underlying (external) reasons of whatever kind to play “the legal game” and accept and follow 
the RR, constitutive conventions define what the RR of a given system is, and hence define what 
is recognized as law in a given society
42.  
It is now clear that even for Marmor, the RR is not the reason-giving rule in the sense that it 
being practiced by almost all officials is a reason for others to follow it too (that would be some 
kind of “strong dependency condition”). The question that arises is: why shall we call such a rule 
a “convention”? Dickson says that Marmor’s implementation of the conventionalist terminology 
is redundant. The RR is a social rule, because the practice of officials is necessary for it to come 
into and be sustained in existence. It neither  justifies a legal authority, nor describe the character 
of political obligation in order to answer questions  whether and under what conditions judges 
ought to accept it as binding and follow it in their legal system. But yet, using the terminology of 
conventionalism “may seem to indicate a role for common official practice going beyond this, 
and may lead some erroneously to believe that the account in question is designed to explain the 
reasons why judges should accept as binding and adhere to the rule of recognition, and that the 
explanation is largely to be found in the fact that their fellow judges behave in a certain way in 
common”
43.  The  terminological  ambiguity  in  such  case  may  surely  lead  to  many 
misunderstandings. It is important argument, because it refers to every account of conventionality 
(both coordinative and constitutive). But why should the “mere conventionality” be ascribed only 
to  reason-giving  practices?  The  plausible  answer  is:  otherwise  every  rule  would  be 
“conventional”, and such an account would be of no philosophical and practical interest. It would 
be actually the anticonventionalist critique of Quine evoked once again, but in “conventionalist 
disguise”. There would be no practical difference in saying “If you really want to play chess – 
play chess” or “If you really want to obey law – obey it” and “If you really want to take a bath, 
take it” and so on, and thus, the external reason would be the mere willingness (a “normative in” 
or basic “normative hunch”) of taking part in such a game or activity. In such account the game 
of chess would be conventional as every other human action (both giving or not giving any 
reasons itself), what would be absurd. 
Consequently, the link between the SFT and NT was too hastily established, and both theses 
should be pulled away. The basic thesis is still the normativity thesis, espoused in Dworkinean 
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critique  of  Hartian  social  rule.  But  accepting  this  we  need  not  to  embrace  the  Dworkinean 
account of legal validity – we can still, as e.g. J. Raz does, accept the social fact thesis as a proper 
criterion for identification of valid law, without accepting the RR as reason giving rule per se. It 
is true, that from the perspective of methodological positivism (explicated in the original Hart’s 
account of the RR), the RR cannot be conceived as conventional, reason-giving rule. The proper 
account of such reasons should be provided by the normative or political jurisprudence, analyzing 
extra-legal reasons for obeying law.  
Moreover, there is significant tip in original account of Searle
44, while he introduces the 
discrimination  between  regulative  an d  constitutive  rules.  It  is  explicitly  denied  there  that 
constitutive rules can be conventions. He writes: “The claim I made was, institutional facts exist 
only within systems of constitutive rules. The systems of rules create the possibility of facts of 
this type; and specific instances of institutional facts, such as the fact that I won at chess or the 
fact that Clinton is president are created by the application of specific rules, rules for checkmate 
or for electing and swearing in presidents, for example. It is perhaps important to emphasize that 
I  am  discussing  rules  and  not  conventions.  It  is  a  rule  of  chess  that  we  win  the  game  by 
checkmating  the  king.  It  is  a  convention  of  chess  that  the  king  is  larger  than  a  pawn. 
«Convention»  implies  arbitrariness,  but  constitutive  rules  in  general  are  not  in  that  sense 
arbitrary”
45.  Searle  is  clear  that  the  institutional  facts  have  some  kind  of  self-referential  and 
holistic normative force, which cannot be connected conceptually with basically arbitrary notion 
of “convention”.  
Marmor treats this remark of Searle as groundless
46.  For me it seems to be crucial. It leads 
us to the conclusion that there are many different kinds of rules, which can give rise to legal 
institutions. But conventions need not only be normati ve, but also – arbitrary (at least to some 
extent, which is to be defined after Quine-Lewis debate, and not gradable in many degrees of 
conventionality,  as  Marmor  suggests).  Of  course,  it  would  be  therefore  right  to  say  that   
American or English rules of recognition are conventional, referring to their particular features, 
but on the grounds of general jurisprudence it is still not justified. Likewise is the claim, that the 
RR is  conventional  in  the sense of being duty-imposing rule.  If it is  nevertheless  uneasy to 
explain both normativity and arbitrariness of conventions, yet having enough reasons to explain 
the  RR  as  a  “constitutive  rule”,  it  would  be  much  more  beneficial  to  abandon  the 
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“conventionalist”  conceptual  framework  (along  with  its,  to  some  extent  misleading, 
terminology).  
Yet, the question what the RR really is remains still the most interesting question posed by 
contemporary legal positivism. I doubt whether RR is a duty-imposing rule. After all, there are no 
substantive reasons, for which we would need such a rule. Therefore “the Strong Conventionality 
Thesis”  (stating  that  RR  is  a  duty-imposing  rule)  being  an  affirmative  reply  to  “the 
Conventionality Puzzle” must be abandoned. Still, there is no need of abandoning “the Weak 
Conventionality Thesis”, which addresses only the crucial role for common official practice in 
legal  theory.  But,  as  Dickson  noticed,  such  an  account  of  conventionality  is  of  no  practical 
interest, as far as it is a mislabeled formulation of classical SFT.   
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